In this paper I present new and original evidence concerning global aggregate concentration. To my knowledge, this evidence constitutes the first systematic effort to measure global aggregate concentration. The data are available only for the years 1994-2001 and require some compromises and approximations.
I. Introduction
There is little doubt that the ever-improving processes of telecommunications and data processing, interacting with liberalized governmental policies, are bringing about rising levels of international trade and international capital flows. Further, through the 1980s and 1990s the global economy experienced major waves of corporate mergers.
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In this context, then, questions about the levels of and trends in aggregate concentration in the global economy --the share of worldwide economic activity that is accounted for by the largest X companies --are interesting ones to ask. This paper addresses those questions, conceptually and empirically. After addressing a number of methodological and data issues, I present new and original evidence concerning global aggregate concentration. To my knowledge, this evidence constitutes the first systematic effort to measure global aggregate concentration.
In summary, suitable data are available only for the years 1994-2001 and require some compromises and approximations. For 2001, the largest 500 global companies' employment accounted for 1.60% of the world labor force, or 9.92% of OECD employment. These companies' profits amounted to 0.94% of world GDP or 4.16% of world gross domestic savings (GDS); their profits also amounted to 1.18% of OECD GDP or 5.62% of OECD gross national saving (GNS). Similar estimates are available for the largest 50 global companies.
II. What Is Global Aggregate Concentration, and Why Is It Interesting?
A. What is global aggregate concentration?
The measurement of aggregate global concentration would measure the share of worldwide economic activity (or some proxy for it) that is accounted for by the X largest companies in the global economy. A "one shot" measurement would yield some information, although there are few standards for comparison and judgment. More information would come from multiple measurements over a period of time, so that trends might be observed.
B. Why is it interesting?
At the beginning, it is important to emphasize what such a measure of global aggregate concentration would not be: It would not be an antitrust indicator and would not provide guidance as to monopoly (market) power in individual markets. To see why, let us suppose (as a hypothetical example) that the largest 100 companies in the global economy accounted for 100% of all economic activity, which would surely be considered to be an extreme (and wildly unrealistic) extent of global concentration. Yet, if each of those 100 companies participated in all relevant markets, the level of seller concentration in each of those markets would be indicative of near-perfect competition.
2
Why then would the measurement of global concentration be of interest? The primary interest in such measurements surely arises from socio-political concerns. To illustrate those concerns, let us take as an example the United States economy. As of 2000, there were 5.5 million corporations, 2.0 million partnerships, 17.7 million non-farm sole 2 The only antitrust concern that might be raised would be that of multi-market contacts among the 100 companies. For discussions of the potential and actual influence of multimarket contacts, see Feinberg (1985) , Rhoades and Heggestad (1985) , Bernheim and Whinston (1990) , and Evans and Kessides (1994) .
proprietorships, and 1.8 million farm sole proprietorships. 3 The overwhelming majority of these enterprises were quite small, consisting of only a few employees each. At the other end of the spectrum, the 100 largest companies, as measured by the Census Bureau, accounted for 11.4% of private-sector employment and 11.5% of private-sector payroll in that same year. Now let us imagine, instead, that the largest 100 companies in the U.S. accounted for all of private sector employment and payroll. The nature of civil society would surely be different in this latter case. The average number of employees per enterprise would be over one million, and the average value added per company would be about $80 billion.
There would be no small enterprises, no start-ups, no alternative places (beyond the 100)
where someone with a new entrepreneurial idea might go to obtain financial support and institutional encouragement. Political power relationships would surely be different as well.
Even if there were 1,000 economy-wide companies (rather than 100), and the per-company magnitudes were only one-tenth as large, the fabric of the economic (and socio-political) landscape would surely be very different from what it actually is.
Of course, there may well be pluses as well as minuses for an economy where very large companies are the dominant or sole private-sector employers. Large companies do tend to provide a greater level of employment security and stability than do smaller companies, which may compensate for the greater bureaucracy and reduced flexibility that accompanies greater size. Nevertheless, the important point is that this hypothetical 100-company economy would be a very different one from the actual U.S. economy; and it seems likely that a large fraction of the inhabitants of the U.S. would consider such a structure to be inferior to what is currently present. Similar considerations would hold for describing a high level of concentration in the global economy.
Finally, even if an observer is agnostic as to whether the global level of aggregate 3 These data, and those that follow, are drawn from White (2001 White ( , 2002 .
concentration is something that warrants attention and concern (after all, beyond the extreme hypothetical example described above, what constitutes a "high" or "low" number?), measurement of trends --changes over time --nevertheless are likely to be of interest: If aggregate concentration is not changing or is decreasing, then anything that might be considered to be a "problem" is not getting worse and may be getting better.
III. Measurement Issues
Since aggregate global concentration is calculated as the share of some measure or measures of global economic activity that is accounted for by the largest X companies, there are three fundamental measurement issues that must be addressed: (1 At first glance, a firm's assets appear to be a plausible method to use in measures of aggregate concentration. After all, assets, like employment, would be an indirect component of a firm's value added; when multiplied by the profit rate on those assets, the firm's profits --a direct component of value added --would be obtained. However, as a practical matter, using firms' assets as the basis for an aggregate concentration measurement presents at least three substantial problems. First, if financial intermediaries, such as banks, insurance companies, and mutual funds are included, there is substantial double-counting, since the assets of these intermediaries largely consist of the liabilities of the enterprises to which they have lent or in which they have invested, with those liabilities in turn having been used to fund the assets of those enterprises.
Second, the presence (until 2001) of two alternative accounting treatments for mergers and acquisitions meant that substantially different levels of assets could appear on an acquiring company's balance sheet, solely because of the acquirer's choice of accounting treatment. For example, in the "pooling" method of accounting, the assets of the acquired company are simply transferred to the acquiring company's balance sheet at their pre-merger balance-sheet values, which would mean relatively lower post-merger asset values. In the "purchase" accounting method, an additional goodwill asset is created and entered on the acquiring company's balance sheet, to reflect the difference between the purchase price and the pre-merger net asset (balance-sheet) value of the acquired company, which would mean relatively higher post-merger asset values. Thus, reported asset values could vary substantially, depending on which accounting treatment was chosen in otherwise identical mergers.
Third, changes over time in accounting and tax treatment of asset depreciation, amortization, and write-offs, as well as changes in the expensing-versus-writeoff treatment of various categories of costs, could arbitrarily affect reported asset values.
An asset-related measure would be the stock market value of a company's equity shares. However, this measurement base would greatly restrict the "universe" for which aggregate concentration could be measured. For the U.S., for example, only about 15,000 companies are publicly listed; over 20 million enterprises would be excluded from this measurement base. Also, stock market bubbles and crashes could well introduce extraneous noise into such calculations.
Two additional measurement issues should be mentioned: First, no conventional measure will completely encompass the indirect influences of some large franchise-oriented companies (e.g., fast-food restaurant chains or hotel chains), since the structural characteristics of the independent franchisee owners will not be directly included in the company data of the franchiser "parent" (except through royalties and other fees). Second, if the political-economy concern that surrounds aggregate concentration is that of corporate influence and control, then the increasing institutionalization of global stock markets may point instead toward a focus on the few hundred large mutual fund companies and pension fund managers that dominate institutional holdings.
Notwithstanding these last comments, value added is clearly the superior all-around measure of relative economic importance for making comparisons across firms and thus for serving as the basis for measurements of aggregate concentration. Unfortunately, value added has a major practical drawback: It is not regularly reported by companies in their public financial statements, nor is it regularly available (with only a few exceptions 7 ) in government data that could be used for aggregate concentration ratios. However, governments and their political processes usually place a great deal of emphasis on employment: "jobs" and job creation and losses. Accordingly, a focus on the employment share of large companies may well be an appropriate runner-up measure to value added. 8 We will use employment for the purposes of discussion below.
B. What entities should be in the numerator?
The number of employees of the largest X companies should be included in the There are no "right" answers to most of these questions. Issues of control are at the heart of the political concern that underlies aggregate concentration and ought to be a guiding principle in any inclusionary selection principles. But the researcher is often at the mercy of whoever has compiled the data and the list of companies. Nevertheless, the inclusionary issues are surely worth keeping in mind.
C White (1980 White ( , 2001 White ( , 2002 , Golbe and White (1988) , and Pryor (2001a) , other attempts at measuring "aggregate" concentration have focused solely on manufacturing or the combined manufacturing and mining sectors (often described as "industrial" concentration). An overview of these prior studies is provided here, to indicate the types of studies and findings that have been made. White (2001 White ( , 2002 Finally, Scherer and Ross (1990, p. 63) provide a cross-section of "industrial" aggregate concentration levels for ten countries, as of 1985. These data indicate that aggregate concentration tends to be inversely related to a nation's economic size. 9 The manufacturing sector in the U.S. reached a peak of 33.1% of private-sector GDP in 1955; by 1999 it had decreased to 20.5%.
V. The Data
A. The numerators.
As was argued above, value added is generally the best measure (numerator and denominator) for aggregate concentration calculations. But, unfortunately, company compilations do not regularly calculate and report value added. However, employment and profits --which companies do report --are fairly good runner-up measures, since the sum of wage costs (which is employment times average employee cost) plus profits approximates value added. Also, employment itself is a major focus of political attention.
The availability of collections of company data involving employment and profits for the calculation of the numerators of any global aggregate concentration measures is quite limited. There are only three candidate sources of data; and, as will be argued, among these three, only one source provides a usable time series.
1. The Financial Times. The Financial Times (FT) publishes annually a list of the 500 largest global companies. The FT list is based on stock market value and extends back to the early 1990s. In the past few years the FT list has also included company sales ("turnover") data in addition to end-of-year stock market values. But, as was argued above, neither stock market value nor company sales is a suitable measure for the calculation of aggregate concentration.
Consequently, the FT 500 series is not suitable for the calculations that are required for this report.
2. Fortune Magazine. Beginning in 1995 (and covering 1994 and after), Fortune magazine has published annually a "500" list of the largest companies worldwide, as measured by sales.
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Fortune includes the employment and profits 11 of those 500 companies. Fortune also has published separate "leading 50" lists, based separately on company employment and company profits (as well as on other company dimensions). exchange rate at which the data for different companies or countries should be converted to a common currency. Fortune uses the average exchange rate for the twelve months covered by a company's annual report to convert all of the profit figures to dollars (as does Forbes).
12 As was discussed above, these inclusionary criteria constitute a methodological issue to which there is no "right" answer. 13 These companies existed, at about their same size, prior to their inclusion in the Fortune lists. Thus it was not the growth of these companies that triggered their inclusion; instead, the inclusions occurred as a consequence of Fortune's editorial judgment that these companies' reporting and disclosure standards had risen sufficiently to warrant their inclusion.
14 Seven Chinese companies were included in the Fortune list of the 50 largest employers for 2001; these seven ranked second, third, fourth, sixth, seventh, ninth, and twenty-first. By contrast, Fortune's list of the leading 50 companies ranked by profits was not affected by the inclusion of the Chinese companies, because those companies tended to be unprofitable. The aggregate profits of the Fortune list of the 50 most profitable companies, for the years 1994-2001, correlates almost perfectly (r = 0.99) with the Forbes profits data discussed and used below. Only one Chinese company (ranked twenty-third) was in the list of 50 most profitable companies for 2001. Since employment and profits constitute the numerators of the aggregate concentration calculations of this report, similar measurement bases are desirable for the denominator. As will be seen, some compromises are necessary.
Since the aim of the calculations is global aggregate concentration measurements, the denominator ought to be based on similarly measured world economy data. 20 Despite its name, the Forbes "Super 50" series lists 51 companies for 2001, because there were two companies that apparently yielded identical composite scores for the 50th place in the list. To keep the series consistent with the 50 companies presented for the previous years, I averaged the employment and profit values for the two "50th" companies to compute the 50-company totals for 2001. 21 The OECD nominal GDP data are available only in index number form. In order to provide a dollar flow series that is directly comparable to the Forbes profit data, I used the World Bank's aggregate GDP figure for "high income" countries for 2000 and then multiplied that value by the index numbers to achieve comparable dollar numbers for the other years in the series. The individual numbers in this series should thus be seen as approximations, but their year-to-year relative values --and thus their usefulness in providing year-to-year comparisons with the Forbes profit data --remain intact. The same caveat applies to the nominal gross national saving data. comparable world and OECD aggregates as the denominators. As the table indicates, the Fortune 500 companies accounted for 1.60% of the world labor force in 2001, and 9.92% of OECD employment. The Fortune list of the largest 50 employers employed 0.64% of the world labor force and 3.96% of OECD employment.
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And the Forbes "Super 50" companies employed 0.26% of the world labor force and 1.63% of OECD employment. 24 Similarly, the Fortune 500 companies' profits amounted to 0.94% of world GDP, etc.
Because there are no previous measurements of global aggregate concentration, there are no good bases for comparison. There are no absolute standards or definitive ways of knowing whether these figures represent "high" or "low" numbers. 25 However, any notion that large companies somehow "dominate" the world economy must surely be tempered by the revelation that the largest 500 companies accounted for only 1.60% of the world labor force in 2001, and their profits amounted to less than 1% of world GDP.
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The Forbes data permit a limited period of time series comparisons, allowing an over-time perspective. It is to those time series comparisons that we now turn.
B. The time series data.
We now return to the data in Table 1 and explore its time series aspects. As can be seen, the Forbes employment data move erratically and grow very slowly over the eight years of data; by comparison the profit data grow steadily and rapidly, but then fall substantially in 2001. The world labor force data grow slowly but steadily, as does the OECD employment data; the world nominal GDP and GDS grow somewhat faster, and the OECD nominal GDP and GNS grow yet faster.
There are two convenient ways of providing somewhat more precision to the growth characterizations of these time series. The first is to compare the value for the first year of a series with the value for the last year of that series and then calculate the average compounded annual rate of growth between the two years. The results of these calculations are presented in the first data column of Table 3 . Using this method, we see that the Forbes employment data did not grow appreciably between 1994 and 2001, while the world labor force grew by 1.7% per year and OECD aggregate employment grew by 1.1% per year.
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The Forbes profit data grew by 11.6% annually, while the world nominal GDP grew by 3.0% and world nominal GDS grew by 2.8%; OECD nominal GDP grew by 6.2%, and OECD nominal GNS grew by 6.9%.
The second method for characterizing a time series is to convert the series to natural logarithms and calculate a regression of the logged time series against the calendar years.
The resulting coefficient on the logged time series represents the overall average compounded annual rate of growth, which takes into account the data from all of the years and does not rely solely on the first and last years' data. 28 The results of this method are presented in the second data column of Table 3 . As can be seen, this method yields an annual rate of increase for the Forbes employment data of 1.1%, while the world labor force data rose at an annual rate of 1.7% and the OECD employment data rose at a rate of 1.1%. 27 All of the first-year/last-year calculations assume continuous compounding. 28 In essence, the regression fits a time trend line to the logged data points.
The Forbes profit data rose at a rate of 14.1%, while the world nominal GDP rose at a rate of 2.3% and world nominal GDS rose at a rate of 1.9%; OECD nominal GDP rose at a 6.2% rate, and OECD nominal GNS rose at a 6.7% rate.
In sum, the Forbes employment data grew at an annual rate that was the same as or was below the comparable aggregates for the world and for the OECD, while the Forbes profit data grew at a rate that was substantially faster than the growth rates of the roughly comparable world and OECD aggregates. We would expect these comparative rates of growth to translate into constant or falling aggregate concentration ratios for employment and rising ratios for profits. That expectation is confirmed in the next section.
C. Global aggregate concentration ratios, 1994-2001.
In Table 4 we present the global aggregate concentration ratios for 1994-2001, using the Forbes data in Table 1 as the numerators; these ratios are also graphed in Figures 1-3 .
As can be seen, the employment levels of the Forbes "Super 50" global companies accounted for a slightly decreasing share of the world labor force or of OECD employment over time. By contrast, the profit levels on the Forbes "Super 50" global companies accounted for an increasing share of the roughly comparable aggregates for the world or the OECD over these same years.
Again, as was true for the constituent time series, we can characterize the movement over time of these ratios either through a first-year/last-year comparison or through a time series regression. 29 These characterizations are presented in Table 5 . The slightly declining share of large companies' employment levels is consistent with the trend for the U.S. found by White (2001 White ( , 2002 . Despite the merger wave of the 1990s, very large companies have not experienced significant relative expansions of employment. This outcome has been partly due to internal rationalizations and cost-cutting by these companies and partly due to significant numbers of spinoffs and divestitures of "pieces" of large companies.
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30 As is pointed out in White (2001 White ( , 2002 , about a third of the transactions that appear in the widely reported "merger and acquisitions" (M&A) annual lists are actually divestitures or spinoffs.
Similarly, the rising absolute levels of large company profits are consistent with the trend found for the U.S. by White (2001 White ( , 2002 , although the upward trend seems to be sharper for the international group. But economy-wide profits in the U.S. were also rising rapidly during the late 1990s, so the ratio for the U.S. was relatively constant during the late 1990s. Consequently, the pattern of rising profit ratios documented in this report is at least partly due to the absence of a profits measure for the denominators and the reliance instead One other feature of the Forbes "Super 50" lists is worth noting: the nationalities of the headquarters of those companies. Table 6 lists the number of companies that were headquartered in each country in 1994 and 2001. As can be seen, the largest number of companies were headquartered in the U.S. in both years, and the number of U.S.-based companies increased between the two years, as did those headquartered in the Netherlands.
The number of companies headquartered in Japan, Germany, and the U.K. fell; companies headquartered in France, Spain, Italy, and Bermuda entered the ranks; and the number of companies headquartered in Switzerland held constant.
V. Conclusion
This essay has presented new and original measurements of global aggregate concentration for the years 1994-2001. The data, albeit imperfect and sketchy, show that the largest global companies accounted for a slightly decreasing share of global employment, but a rising share of global profits. The former trend is consistent with that found for the U.S. for the late 1990s. The latter trend is different but is likely overstated and is unlikely to be sustained.
Future years will yield more data that can be used to check these trends and refine these measurements. 
